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The Impact of a Phased Retirement Program: A Case Study 
 
Phased retirement has been discussed as a means for increasing labour supply for people of 
older active age. The idea is that instead of leaving a full-time job early for full-time 
retirement, an employee should reduce the working time either in the same job or by 
changing jobs, and stay on in the labour market. In this paper we analyze the factors that 
influence the decision to take up a part-time pension and continue working at the same work 
place at reduced hours. We do this by using a unique data set from one employer in the 
governmental sector in Sweden, Stockholm University. The pension scheme is a special part-
time pension scheme introduced for state employees in 2003. Employees 61 years and older 
can apply for a part-time pension up to the age of 65. The employers decide if they will 
accept or reject the application. They may also encourage employees to apply or discourage 
them from doing so. We have a data set covering all employees of the age groups who are 
eligible and a rich data set with information on the employees and also on the units 
(departments) who in practice decide if an application should be accepted or not. We find that 
both the effects on pension wealth of taking a part-time pension, and the economic situation 
of the department are important for the propensity for becoming a part-time pensioner. Also 
individual characteristics such as gender, age, earnings and occupation are important. 
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1. Introduction 
The role of pension systems is of current interest in a Western Europe that is facing an ageing 
population. Many attempts have been made to raise the age of retirement. One policy that has 
been tested in several countries is to offer greater flexibility for the worker by introducing a 
possibility of phased retirement with a favourable part-time pension option.  
Sweden has tested different part-time pension schemes. Since the early 1960s it has been 
possible to take out part of the old-age pension before the normal retirement age, or postpone 
it. In such case the pension has been actuarially reduced or augmented, respectively. From 
1976 to 2000 a special part-time pension was in force for those aged 60-64 (in 1994 changed 
to 61-64).
1  A take-up of such a pension did not reduce the old age pension taken out at 65. In 
2001-2002 no special part-time pension option existed. However, in 2003 a special part-time 
pension system was introduced for those employed by the central government and in 2007 a 
scheme for those employed by local government (municipalities and county councils) was 
introduced.  
In this paper we study the effects of the part-time pension scheme for employees in the central 
government. The data set at our disposal is employees at Stockholm University who have 
either entered the phased retirement option, have remained fully employed or have ended their 
employment in some other way. Stockholm University is a state university with more than 
5000 employees. This sample is not representative of the working population in Sweden of 
course, but has a great advantage by the richness of information it provides in describing 
characteristics of the individuals as well as modelling ways out of employment. 
Although there is a great interest in part-time pensions in many countries, there has not been 
much research on it.
2 Most studies are based on macro indicators and not on individually 
based panel studies, which in most cases would be the preferred form. Sundén (1994) studies 
the Swedish special part-time pension scheme by using a Swedish panel data base and 
examines what those who take a part-time pension would have done instead – continued to 
work full time or take an early full time disability pension. The results from this study have 
been combined with information on the actual hours worked before and after taking a part-
                                                 
1 See Ginsburgh (1985), Wadensjö (1993, 1996) and Wise (1990) for some presentations of that system. 
2 See the various contributions in Delsen & Reday-Mulvey (1998), and Latulippe & Turner (2000) for surveys of 
the international experiences.  There are a number of papers that analyze phased retirement in the US. See for 
example Chen (2002), Chen and Scott (2003), Clark (2002), Even and Macpherson (2004), Ponner, Perun and 
Steuerle (2002), Scahill and Forman (2002) and Wong (2002).    3
time pension to calculate the labour supply effect (see Wadensjö, 2006a and b, and 
Lachowska, Sundén and Wadensjö, 2008). 
A study of much relevance for our study has examined the effects of the introduction of a 
part-time pension scheme at one of the campuses of the University of North Carolina (see 
Allen, 2004 and Allen, Clark and Ghent, 2004). The results indicate that the share who retires 
increased after the introduction of the system. The increase in the share who retires is 
however less than the share who accepted a part-time pension. This means that of those taking 
up a part-time pension some would have continued to work full-time and some would have 
been full-time pensioners. The study also tries to answer the question of what characterizes 
those who became part-time pensioners. It shows that the part-time pensioners are more 
similar to those who continue to work full-time than those who become full-time pensioners.  
 
2. Phased retirement in the governmental occupational 
pension system 
Since 2003, the occupational agreement allows the employees in the state sector to apply for a 
part-time pension. The rules allowing entrance to the phased retirement program are the 
following:  
•  Phased retirement can be offered to individuals starting the month they turn 61 years of 
age and at the latest until turning 65 years of age 
•  The individual must have been entitled, for at least 120 months, to a retirement plan that 
has been negotiated through a collective agreement 
•  Phased retirement option can, at most, amount to 50 per cent of full-time employment 
•  The phased retirement benefit corresponds to 60 per cent of the wage lost due to the 
decrease in hours, but the size of the phased retirement benefits changes proportionally to 
changes in the wage 
•  The employer can accept or reject an application for a part-time pension 
•  Phased retirement in the state sector is financed by the employer, who pays a 24.26 per 
cent tax on the phased retirement benefit. 
Table 1 shows the number of newly accepted phased retirements over the years 2003-2007 in 
the state sector. Most have been granted a phased retirement of 20 percent of full-time work, 
followed by 50 percent in the early years 2003 and 2004. Women more often take up a 20 per   4
cent part-time pension, men more often a 50 per cent part-time pension. It is not possible to 
conclude from the statistics if the development in the direction towards 20 per cent pensions is 
due to that the employees want it (free on Fridays or shorter workdays) or due to that the 
employers for financial reasons do not accept other forms of part-time pensions. Most of those 
who are granted a part-time pension are 61 years of age, i.e. the lowest possible age.  
 
Table 1 New phased retirees per year in 2003-2007 
Year   
Scope  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 
Total 
20 % or less  719 680 895 1000  1212  4506 
21-49 %  352 259 279 288 267  1445 
50 %  956 798 662 570 559  3545 
Total  2027 1737 1836 1858 2038  9496 
Source: SPV, Pensionsavgångar inom statsförvaltningen, Kommentarer, Bilaga 2. 2007-02-28 and SPV, Statliga 
pensioner – trender och tendenser, Dnr: 2008-3111-76. 
 
In practice it is possible to combine one's employment and phased retirement with outside 
work. Thus it is possible for example to be employed half-time in the state sector, be retired 
half-time and be employed half-time outside the state sector.
3  
Studies conducted on the effects of pension systems on an individual's retirement decision 
often do not model the financial situation of the employer. In the case of phased retirement at 
Stockholm University the inclusion of such a variable is desirable. At Stockholm University, 
the department (or a corresponding unit) pays 25 per cent of the costs, while the University 
pays the remaining 75 per cent. As the phased retirement benefit is computed to be 60 per 
cent of the wage that vanish due to the decrease in hours, the department pays only 25 per 
cent of that cost itself. Thus the cost incurred for the department is 15 per cent of the wage 
                                                 
3 According to the agreement there are no restrictions. The instructions given by The Swedish Agency for 
Government Employers (Arbetsgivarverket, 2002) state however that it is not allowed to work during hours with 
part time pension. And that the local employer should verify that the employee fulfils this condition but that the 
employer could give the employee the right to work to a minor extent. According to information we have 
received quite a few part-time pensioners are working during the same hours for which they receive part-time 
pension. See Mårtensson (2005).   5
paid to the phased retiree. Hence it can be argued that phased retirement is a relatively cheap 
option for the direct employer to cut down on costs if they get a budget cut.  
The presentation of the part-time pension system shows that it is important to have data both 
on the employees who are eligible to apply for a part-time pension and for the units who may 
accept or reject the applications. In the next section we will present the data and variable used.  
 
3. Data 
The data originate from the Personnel Administrative Office at the Stockholm University. The 
data are comprised of the set of phased retirees in the years 2003-2006, and a set of 
employees eligible for applying for phased retirement in the same period. The data sets 
contain information on personal characteristics such as age and gender.
4 Further, the data 
include rich information on employment characteristics; department, institution and faculty 
affiliation, position held, form of employment, length of service in the state sector as well as 
at Stockholm University, working hours in relation to full-time employment, retirement plan 
type, and the scope of the phased retirement as a part of full-time employment and reasons for 
changing or ending employment. Information regarding annual wage payments for the years 
2003-2006 is also available. 
The data were matched with information retrieved from the annual accounts done by the 
administrative units at the University for the years 2002-2005. This set contained variables 
such as 
•  total revenue 
•  annual capital gain 
•  balance brought forward/capital gain brought from last year and 
•  balance carried forward/total capital gain  
 
3.1 Individual characteristics 
The information from the accounts reveals that some individuals have several channels of 
payment. The most common reason for that was that a person held several positions in 
parallel, e.g. as a lecturer and as a researcher and hence had two sources of income that year. 
                                                 
4 For a full description of the variables, see the Appendix 1   6
In some cases, individuals had changed their form of employment within the department and 
in rare cases between departments (no one had switched faculty affiliation). As the size of the 
sample allows for examining those cases in turn (the number of individuals with this type 
amounted to 64 individual cases), an analysis followed. The annual payments for those 
individuals were summed over each year, so was the share of employment (in most cases this 
added up to 100 per cent). Regarding the indicators of position held, form of employment and 
department affiliation, the most recent position and department were selected for the 
individual. In a great majority of cases the positions that were held in parallel did not suggest 
that a great change in the duties performed was present. 
Arranging the merged data eventually produced a set of 314 individuals that provided 
information on the individuals in the manner of a pooled cross-section running over the years 
2003-2006. Although the same individual may appear in the data in several years, each yearly 
observation of an individual is treated as a distinct observational unit.  
A scrutiny of the structure of the data followed and indicators of time of exiting the data set, 
or making the choice of gradually retiring were created.
5 The complete data set comprises 
1,154 observations across the years 2003 until 2006, where certain individuals appear in all 
the four years or three years and some in two and a few only once (i.e. those who had exited 
employment at Stockholm University the first year they are observed).  
In Table 2 summary statistics of characteristics of those who have chosen the phased 
retirement option and those who were eligible at a given year to apply but did not are 
presented. We see that there are slightly more men than women in the population studied. The 
age categories range between 61 years to 65 years in 2006 as only those in that age group are 
eligible for a part-time pension. About 28 per cent of the full sample have been granted a part-
time pension.  
 
                                                 
5 As the individuals entered or exited the retirement options at different dates of the year, but the payments are 
reported on an annual basis, we made the simplification of rounding the date off downwards to the year that the 
individual made his/her choice.   7
Table 2 Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean  Sd  p50  Min  Max  Range  N 
Phased and eligible             
Woman .449  .498  0 0 1 1  1154
Age 62.29  1.16  62 61 65 4  1154
Phased .279  .449  0 0 1 1  1154
Working hours/full-time 
hours 
98.29 7.39  100 50 100 50  1154
Length at SU  24.52  11.48  26 0 46 46  1154
Earnings/10 000  36.78  15.63  34.93 0 107.6 107.6  1154
            
Phased            
Woman .581  .494  1 0 1 1  322
Age 62.71  1.29  63 61 65 4  322
Phased 1  0  1 1 1 0  322
Working hours /full-
time hours 
97.82 9.10  100 50 100 50  322
Length at SU  25.13  11.19  26 2 44 42  322
Earnings/10 000  28.36  10.18  27.61 0 64.5 64.5  322
            
Eligible            
Woman .398  .490  0 0 1 1  832
Age 62.13  1.05  62 61 64 3  832
Phased 0  0  0 0 0 0  832
Working hours/full-time 
hours 
98.47 6.61  100 55 100 45  832
Length at SU  24.28  11.59  26 0 46 46  832
Earnings/10 000  40.04  16.16  39.03 0 107.6 107.6  832
Source: Calculations based on data for Stockholm University for 2003-2006. 
 
We note that a higher share of the female employees than of the male employees have chosen 
the phased retirement option. As a result of the rules for entering the option, the eligible sub-
sample is the same age as the phased retirees. The table shows that the youngest age of a 
phased pensioner in this sample is 61 years, while the most senior is 65. This is due to 
rounding among the individuals, who may have entered the phased retirement option in the 
middle of the year that they turned 65. We note that the share of full-time employment is 
similar, but that the variance is higher for the phased retirees.  
We have looked at the ways the phased retirees exited our sample. About 77 per cent, or 34 
individuals of the sample had retired – the other options consisted of early old-age retirement 
(not shown here).  
Turning instead to the duration of position held one notes that phased retirees have a similar 
higher tenure, about 24 years, on average as the eligible sample.    8
Another variable describing the characteristics of the individuals who chose phased retirement 
is the scope of the phased retirement, see the figure below. A clear majority have chosen a 




Figure 1 Percentage distribution of scope of the part-time pensions  
 
It is interesting to see where the phased retirees work; we can do this by analyzing faculty 
affiliation and also what positions these individuals hold. The Faculty of Natural Sciences has 
the largest share phased retirees, followed by the Faculty of Social Sciences. See Table 3. 
Among the eligible who have not received a part-time pension, the Faculty of Social Sciences 
employed the largest part, followed by the Faculty of Natural Sciences.  
 
Table 3 Faculty Affiliation 
Phased Eligible   
Faculty  Freq  Per cent  Cum  Freq  Per cent  Cum 
Administration  48 14.91  14.91  54  6.49  6.49 
Humanities  47  14.60 29.50  205  24.64 31.13 
Law School  3  0.93 30.43  27  3.25 34.38 
Natural Sciences  104  32.30 62.73  218  26.20 60.58 
Social Sciences  99  30.75 93.48  275  33.05 93.63 
University library  21  6.52 100  53  6.37 100 
Total  322  100   832  100  
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Our data set allows us to see what positions the individuals hold; this indicator suffers, 
however, from being largely titular and not fully reflecting the occupation of the individual in 
question. Instead, we have grouped these titles into five occupational categories: strenuous 
work
6, lower administrative personnel, higher administrative personnel, researcher/professor, 
and lecturer. We see that the phased retirees mainly belong to the higher administrative 
personnel category. Also for the entire sample, the category 'Higher Administrative Personnel' 
is the largest with 46 per cent, followed by 'Researcher/Professor'. See Table 4.  
 
Table 4 Occupational categories 
Phased Eligible  Occupational categories  
Freq  Per cent Cum  Freq  Per cent  Cum 
Strenuous work  6 1.86  1.86  10  1.20 1.20 
Lower Administrative Staff  54 16.77  18.63  72  8.65  9.86 
Higher Administrative Staff  180 55.90  74.53 381  45.79  55.65 
Researcher/Professor  28 8.70  83.23  241  28.97 84.62 
Lecturer  54 16.77  100.00 128  15.38 100.00 
Total  322 100.00    832  100.00  
Source: Calculations based on data for Stockholm University for 2003-2006. 
 
3.2. Computation of the Incentive Measures 
The pensions depend on the earnings history of the individual. We lack information on the 
earnings histories in our data set. In order to model the economic incentives that might 
influence the individual's decision to retire early, we have projected earnings profiles for the 
individuals in the future and in the past. In order to compute each individual's pension wealth 
and its increments we needed to make assumptions on the possible age-earnings profiles. For 
the age-earnings profiles, we have used the 2003 wave of the annual Labor Force Survey 
conducted by Statistics Sweden and controlled for age, gender and occupation; the 
coefficients are presented in Appendix 3.
7  
We projected the annual earnings, expressed in 2003 prices, for all the eligible individuals 15 
years back in time and depending on their age at the time of the observation, also by the 
                                                 
6 'Strenuous' applies in this case to both physically demanding work and sedentary type of jobs that do not 
require qualifications. 
7 We have also performed the imputations for age squared; the earnings profile then indicated a decrease in 
earnings followed past one’s 55
th birthday, and for our calculations we needed the past 15 years to have been 
among the best an individual has had.    10
number of years till they turn 65 years.
8  As we lack the actual working histories of the 
individuals in the sample, we have assumed that all have worked for at least 30 years and that 
their work characteristics have not changed over this time (i.e. the persons in the sample have 
been working with the same full- or part-time share at the same workplace with the same 
occupational status). As these assumptions are quite strong this likely causes the incentive 
measures to carry measurement errors.  
In order to evaluate how the rules of the pension (occupational and public) system in Sweden 
affect the decision to enter phased retirement we have computed pension wealth of the 
individuals eligible to enter phased retirement and of those who have already chosen this 
option. An individual’s pension wealth is the discounted expected flow of benefits a worker 




where Ba is the annual old-age benefit expected by an individual of an actual age a if (s)he 
chooses the phased retirement option at an age r > a. The old-age benefit does not change 
once it is calculated. π(r|a) is the probability that an individual is alive at the age of making 
the decision, r = {a + 4, a + 4 + 1, …, max age}, conditioned on being alive at his actual age a. 
β is a subjective time discount factor in the interval (0,1). So someone aged 61, who goes into 
phased retirement at the same age will have a pension wealth of:  
 
 
In the construction of this hypothetical variable, we have adopted a convention that an eligible 
individual can make his or her choice immediately, i.e. the pension wealth is evaluated at the 
current decision point.  
If the pension wealth of going into phased retirement increases, the demand for all goods will 
go up, including leisure. Hence, the phased retirement option creates an income effect that is 
supposed to affect the choice of early retirement positively. However, many social security 
systems have rules which create incentives to postpone early retirement in order to create 
more pension wealth. Thus there is also a substitution effect present in delaying the choice of 
                                                 
8 We have used 15 years as for the majority of the individuals the largest component of their old-age benefit will 
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choosing early retirement. In order to evaluate this substitution effect, we have computed two 
incentive measures: benefit accrual and benefit peak value. The (one-year) benefit accrual is 
defined as the change in the pension wealth due to postponing a retirement option one 
additional year: 
 




















− − =  
 
This measure captures short-term incentives in postponing a retirement option. As Coile and 
Gruber (2007) stress, an additional year of work causes an increment in the pension wealth for 
two reasons. Postponing the decision to go into phased retirement changes the pension wealth, 
but the decision to postpone this option causes the time when claiming benefits to be 
shortened. The net effect of an increment in pension wealth will hence vary among 
individuals as their preferences might vary.  
The change in the pension wealth from postponing a decision by a year captures a short-term 
increment offered by the pension system. If we assume the individuals to be rational decision 
makers, we should expect that they will take into account not only the one-year accrual that a 
given decision generates, but rather the difference in making a decision today and all possible 
future dates. A second measure, aimed at evaluating the accrual over an entire choice set of 
pension wealth is called the peak value.
9 The peak value is the maximum difference between 
the pension wealth expected with making the phased retirement choice today and the same 
choice in the future, bounded by the age of 64 years being the last possible decision point. 
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The benefit computation was done by using the rules described in the earlier section. The 
subjective discount rate was set at 2 per cent, making β ≈ 0.98. The survival probabilities were 
computed on the basis of the life-length tables from Statistics Sweden for the year 2005 and 
vary by gender. The calculation was done for each age, starting from the individual's current 











                                                 
9 The peak value was first used by Coile and Gruber (2007).    12
 
As our analysis will be constrained to deal with those who are eligible to apply for phased 
retirement and to those who have already chosen it, we compute pension wealth only for those 
groups. For the phased retirees, who have already made their choice, accrual and peak values 
are set to zero, as there is no postponing of the retirement choice. As the scope of phased 
retirement is in theory a continuous choice variable, we needed to make an assumption as to 
what extent the individuals consider taking out their phased retirement benefits. We have set 
this scope to equal 50 per cent, as this is the most popular choice among current phased 
retirees.  
Table 5 below presents the summary statistics of pension wealth, pension wealth divided by 
the yearly income, peak value and accrual, also those divided by the income variable.  
 
Table 5 Summary statistics regarding pension wealth, peak value and accrual 
Variable Mean  Sd  p50  Min  Max  Range  N 
Pension Wealth  2603124 1548467  2240965 0  12859165  12859165  832 
Pension Wealth/Earnings  6.117 1.273  6.055 0  11.948  11.948  821 
Peak Value  82120 63212  73427 -146 251005  251151  832 
Peak Value/Earnings  .2666 .2305  .2136 -.0002  .9255 .9257 821 
Accrual   28211 18045  29208 -146 64590 64736 832 
Accrual/Earnings  .0914 .0681  .0837 -.0002  .2475 .2478 821 
Source: Calculations based on data for Stockholm University for 2003-2006. 
 
We see that there is plenty of variation in the pension wealth among the individuals and that 
this also applies to the incentive measures. The graph below displays the mean pension wealth 
by each age category. We see that it increases on average up to 64 years of age and then 
decreases rapidly as at 65 there is no possibility of entering the phased retirement option.  
   13
 
 
Figure 2 Mean pension wealth by age 
 
3.3. The variables for the financial situation of the department  
As we are able to identify the department that our individuals work at, we have been able to 
link it to variables indicating the financial situations of the departments. We have defined a 
measure of surplus for the department related to the total revenue of the department (grants 
from the university and from outside sources) over the accounting year.
10 The higher this 
measure is, (the total margin) the better the financial situation of the department in question. 
This measure reflects the total capital gain after last years gain/loss has been added/deducted. 
The second measure is the net margin in the year and does not consider the capital that is 
brought from the year previously.
11 Hence it is a net margin. This measure reflects current 
profitability of a department better than the first measure
12. Table 6 gives summary statistics 
from the balance sheets. 
 
                                                 
10 Total margin = ((balance carried forward)/(total revenue))=((total capital gain)/(total revenue))  
11 Net margin = (("balance carried forward"-"balance brought forward")/(total revenue))((total capital gain-last 
year's capital gain)/(total revenue)) = ((annual capital gain)/(total revenue)) 
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Table 6 Summary Statistics of the Financial Variables 
Variable Mean  Sd  p50  Min  Max  Range  N 
Phased or Eligible           
Net margin  -.0065  .0628  3.2e-04  -.4142  .2340  .6481  1139 
Total margin  .0438  .1794  .0565  -.6299  .8341  1.464  1139 
             
Phased             
Net margin  -.0101  .0612  -.0014  -.3038  .2340  .5378  317 
Total margin  .0172  .1753  .0173  -.6116  .8341  1.446  317 
             
Eligible             
Net margin  -.0051  .0633  3.2e-04  -.4142  .2340  .6481  822 
Total margin  .0541  .1801  .0696  -.6299  .8298  1.46  822 
Source: Calculations based on data for Stockholm University for 2003-2006. 
 
Hence we see that net margin is negative for both the sample where we have eligible 
individuals and phased retirees and that for the latter it is smaller. We have restricted our 
sample by removing the observations for three administrative units as transfers dominate the 
accounts for those units. 
 
4. The Empirical Model 
The objective of our study is to establish correlations influencing the decision to enter the 
phased retirement program and we shall consider the data as consisting of person-year 
observations. Hence the full data set is a pooled cross-section of individuals at different points 
in time. For this we need to narrow our sample to include those individuals who are eligible to 
enter the phased retirement option. Hence the sample on which the regressions are performed 
includes those individuals who have chosen the phased retirement option and those who are 
between the ages of 61 and 65, are employed at Stockholm University, have not become 
retired in any of the forms described earlier and have working hours in proportion to full-time 
employment that is more than 50 per cent. Table 7 presents how many were eligible in each 
year to apply to the phased retirement option.  
   15
Table 7 Number of employees eligible for applying for a part-time pension 






Source: Calculations based on data for Stockholm University for 2003-2006. 
 
Hence, together with the 322 phased retirees in the sample, we can use 1154 observations in 
the regressions.  
In order to evaluate the incentives in the pension system on the probability of the individuals 
to choose phased retirement we include the variables pension wealth, accrual and peak value 
in the regression analysis. Following Coile and Gruber (2007) we can plausibly see two 
effects that the incentives of the pension system can have on the decision to go into phased 
retirement. One is an income effect: choosing phased retirement creates a stream of benefits 
that would not have been there otherwise and this can raise the demand for all goods, 
including leisure. A second effect is a substitution effect created by the increments in pension 
wealth by postponing one’s decision. Postponing ones claims to the (phased) retirement 
benefits can increase the consumption when retired, through the accruals.  
Further, the decision to go into phased retirement can be influenced by the aspects related to 
one’s workplace. As the departments at Stockholm University have their own budgets and the 
decision to admit phased retirement (both at the extensive and intensive margin) is at the 
discretion of the employer, the level of the financial stability may influence the probability of 
an employee going into phased retirement. We have two variables at our disposal that indicate 
the financial performance of the institutions.  
The econometric model we used is the basic linear probability model: 
 
it it it it it FIN INC PW eko INC PW retirement Phased ε θ β β α + + + + + = = −1 2 1 ' ) , , , | 1 Pr( β x' x  
 
Where the dependant variable is the probability that the individual i at age t has chosen the 
phased retirement option and zero otherwise. PW is the pension wealth variable, while INC is 
any of the two incentive measures described above (accrual or peak value). x is a vector of 
personal characteristics deemed to have an effect on the decision to enter the phased 
retirement program. The variables at our disposal that might influence the individual's choice   16
are: age, gender, annual payments, type of work performed, form of employment, type of 
retirement agreement, place of employment and tenure.  
Further, it is interesting to see whether the financial situation of the department might 
constitute a factor in the decision-making. Hence, FINit-1 is a polynomial function of the eko 
or eko2 variable. The hypothesis is that for FINit-1 = ekoit-1, the coefficient ought to have a 
negative sign; a department whose financial situation is better might be inclined to be less 
supportive of its employees partially exiting into retirement. It is however quite possible that 
the relationship between the choice of gradually retiring and the eko variables is of a non-
linear. If FINit-1 = ekoit-1+ ekoit-1
2 then the relationship is still presumed to be negative but 
could be of a decreasing or increasing nature.  
There is also the issue of reverse causality. That is of the number of phased retirees affecting 
the finances of the institution. We try to omit this problem by always using a one-year lag in 
the FIN variables to the year in which the individual is observed. 
 
5. Estimation results 
The results from the econometric estimations are shown in Table 8 and 9 (these two tables are 
placed after the main text). In all of the regressions we have clustered the standard errors so as 
to account for that the same person can appear in the pooled OLS up to four times. Hence the 
standard errors have been clustered on the individual's identification number. We will make 
comments on the main results below.  
The coefficient for the variable “woman” is positive meaning that women are more likely to 
become part-time pensioners. However, the values are not always significantly different from 
zero. The propensity to take a part-time pension increases by age – the closer to the normal 
retirement age of 65 the more likely it is that the employee is part-time pensioned. The 
propensity to become part-time pensioned was highest in 2003, the first year of the scheme. 
This may be explained by that a number of employees would have applied for a part-time 
pension earlier if it had been possible, applied as soon as it was possible to do so, i.e. in 2003. 
The number of years employed at the university however does not influence the probability to 
become a part-time pensioner but those with tenured employment are more likely to take up a 
part-time pension. Part-time pensions entail costs for the departments and it is likely that a 
department is more reluctant to accept an application from someone with temporary 
employment status. Those with higher earnings less often become a part-time pensioner. This   17
is the case even if controlling for occupational status. An explanation for that higher earnings 
is combined with a lower propensity to take up a part-time pension could be that those who 
have higher earnings also have more interesting work tasks and therefore want to continue to 
work full-time. Among the occupational groups, professors and researchers are those who are 
least likely to take up a part-time pension. 
For the pension variables we got the expected negative values for both benefit accrual (table 
8) and peak value (table 9). The more the pension wealth increases if the employee works one 
year more (benefit accrual) and the higher the employee’s peak of the pension wealth is 
year(s) ahead, the more likely it is that the employee will continue to work and not take up a 
part-time pension. Benefit accrual explains more of the variation in the propensity to take up a 
part-time pension than the peak value does. As expected pension wealth has a positive sign. It 
is highly significant in estimations including the peak value variable but not in those including 
the benefit accrual variable. 
The financial situation of the department/unit is included in the estimations by both a linear 
and a quadratic term. The coefficients are both highly significant, the linear term with a 
negative sign and the quadratic with a positive sign. The relation is U-shaped.  The part-time 
intensity is higher both among the units with a good financial status and those with a bad 
financial one compared to those in a middle group. The explanation for choosing the part-time 
solution can be different for units with a good and with a bad financial situation. For 
departments with a bad financial situation the part-time pension can be a cost-efficient way of 
reducing the personal costs compared to laying off persons. For departments with a good 
financial situation granting a part-time pension could be a method to reward employees – it 
costs but the department has resources for doing that. A method to further study this issue is 
to examine if the part-time pensions have the same scope at departments with a weak financial 
standing as at those with a strong financial standing. See Table 10.  
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Table 10 Financial situation for the department/unit and scope of the part-time pensions 
Scope Departments  with 
negative capital (1) 
Departments with a 
small positive 
capital compared to 
their income (2) 
Departments with a 
large positive 
capital compared to 
their income  (3) 
20 % or less  1 (<1 %)  1 (1 %)  0 (0 %) 
21-49 %  99 (67 %)  47 (55 %)   52 (60 %) 
50 %  48 (33 %)   38 (44 %)   35 (40 %) 
Total  147 (100 %)  86 (100 %)  87 (100 %) 
Note. The boundary between (2) and (3) is set so that the part-time pensioners in the two groups are equal; for 
(2) the economic margin is between 0 and 0.1, and for (3) it is higher than 0.1. 
Source: Calculations based on data for Stockholm University for 2003-2006. 
 
The table shows that there are some differences. Relatively fewer part-time pensioners have 
the highest possible part-time scope, i.e. 50 per cent, at the departments with a weak financial 
position.  
 
6. Summary and conclusion 
In 2003 a new part-time pension scheme was introduced in Sweden for state employees. 
Those aged 61-64 who met certain requirements could apply for a pension and the employer 
could accept or reject the application. If granted the employee received a compensation of 60 
per cent of reduction in earnings. 
We study this system at one state employer, Stockholm University, in 2003-2006. The focus 
of our interest are the factors that influence if an employee who is eligible for a part-time 
pension actually takes up a pension  The outcome is dependent on both that the employee 
makes an application and that the employer approves it. 
At Stockholm University the departments and other units on the same level decide themselves 
in practice if they should encourage applications and accept or reject them. The departments 
pay part of the pension costs but not all of them. The costs are partly covered by the central 
university administration. 
The outcome is determined by actions from both the employee and the employer. In our 
estimations we have therefore included both variables that influence the decision to apply for   19
the employee, and variables that influence the decision to accept an application by the 
employer. 
As variables on the individual level, we have included individual characteristics and variables 
representing economic incentives to take up or not take up a part-time pension formed by the 
pension schemes (social security and supplementary). As variables on the employer side we 
have included a variable representing the economic situation of the department. 
The main results regarding the individual characteristics are that the propensity to take up a 
part-time pension is higher among women than men, higher among those close to retirement 
age, lower among those with high earnings, and higher among professors/researchers than 
among categories of personnel.  
We get the expected results regarding the pension variables. The higher the pension accrual 
(for waiting an extra year) and the higher the peak value of the pension wealth (compared to 
the present pension wealth), the lower is the propensity to take up a part-time pension. A 
higher pension wealth (compared to earnings) means a higher propensity to take up a pension. 
This variable is however not significant in all formulations of the model. 
The estimations show that the take-up of part-time pensions is highest among the departments 
with the worst economic situation (a cost efficient method to reduce the personnel) and 
among the departments with the best economic situation (a way of rewarding employees). 
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  Table 8 Factors influencing part-time pension including pensions wealth and benefit accrual  
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pension  Wealth/Earnings  0.0104 0.00729  0.0156 0.0168 
  (0.82) (0.58) (1.31) (1.42) 
Benefit  Accrual/1000  -0.0173*** -0.0175*** -0.0175*** -0.0173*** 
  (-21.3) (-21.7) (-23.0) (-23.0) 
Woman  0.0584** 0.0553** 0.0364  0.0435* 
  (2.41) (2.30) (1.58) (1.89) 
62  years  0.0309** 0.0304** 0.0246** 0.0233* 
  (2.37) (2.37) (1.97) (1.86) 
63  years  0.0381** 0.0415** 0.0352** 0.0337* 
  (2.07) (2.27) (1.98) (1.87) 
64  years  0.0538** 0.0581** 0.0506** 0.0463* 
  (2.08) (2.25) (2.02) (1.83) 
65  years  0.125*** 0.130*** 0.116**  0.103** 
  (2.80) (2.89) (2.54) (2.18) 
Earnings/10  000  -0.0153*** -0.0153*** -0.0147*** -0.0148*** 
  (-19.3) (-18.9) (-17.4) (-17.0) 
Employment in years at SU  0.000956  0.000609  -0.000177  -0.000650 
  (1.05) (0.67) (-0.20)  (-0.73) 
year  2004  -0.0371** -0.0403** -0.0416***  -0.0383** 
  (-2.26) (-2.48) (-2.64) (-2.40) 
year  2005  -0.0323 -0.0371 -0.0317 -0.0279 
  (-1.37) (-1.59) (-1.38) (-1.21) 
year  2006  -0.152*** -0.150*** -0.200*** -0.193*** 
  (-5.67) (-5.55) (-6.52) (-6.09) 
Net  margin  -0.182*** -0.178*** -0.118**  -0.0818 
  (-3.74) (-3.60) (-2.40) (-1.29) 
Net  margin  squared  0.212** 0.207** 0.165*  0.201** 
  (2.25) (2.20) (1.86) (2.02) 
Tenured employment    0.176**  0.194***  0.191*** 
    (2.47) (3.02) (3.02) 
Strenuous  work    0.0907  0.0818 
    (0.93)  (0.84)   21 
Lower Admin. Staff      0.101**  0.0902** 
    (2.26)  (2.08) 
Higher Admin. Staff      0.170***  0.172*** 
    (6.07)  (6.12) 
Lecturer    0.183***  0.197*** 
    (5.91)  (6.35) 
Administration    0.0451 
     ( 0 . 9 3 )  
Humanities     -0.0513* 
     ( - 1 . 7 2 )  
Law  School     -0.00349 
     (-0.073) 
Natural  Sciences     0.0374 
     ( 1 . 4 3 )  
Library     -0.0232 
     ( - 0 . 6 1 )  
Constant  1.128*** 0.991*** 0.824*** 0.818*** 
  (10.2) (8.00) (6.75) (6.72) 
Observations  1127 1127 1127 1127 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.71 0.72 0.74 0.74 
F  201.0 189.8 145.1 116.7 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
ACCRUAL REGRESSION 
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  Table 9 Factors influencing part-time pension including pensions wealth and peak value 
Variable    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pension wealth/Earnings  0.0338*** 0.0315*** 0.0396*** 0.0410*** 
  (2.77) (2.64) (3.40) (3.58) 
Peak  Value/1000  -0.00512*** -0.00517*** -0.00517*** -0.00510*** 
  (-19.4) (-19.8) (-20.8) (-21.1) 
Woman  0.0447*  0.0421 0.0205 0.0300 
  (1.71) (1.62) (0.82) (1.22) 
62  years  -0.0945*** -0.0959*** -0.102***  -0.102*** 
  (-6.91) (-7.16) (-7.80) (-7.88) 
63  years  -0.194*** -0.193*** -0.199*** -0.198*** 
  (-8.80) (-8.82) (-9.28) (-9.34) 
64  years  -0.253*** -0.252*** -0.258*** -0.260*** 
  (-7.51) (-7.50) (-7.92) (-8.07) 
65 years  0.0124  0.0155  0.00273  -0.0165 
  (0.25) (0.32) (0.054)  (-0.32) 
Earnings/10  000  -0.0159*** -0.0159*** -0.0154*** -0.0155*** 
  (-19.6) (-19.3) (-17.4) (-17.3) 
Employment in years at SU  0.00159  0.00132  0.000558  -0.0000677 
  (1.63) (1.34) (0.58) (-0.071) 
year  2004  -0.0306  -0.0331* -0.0347* -0.0299 
  (-1.56) (-1.69) (-1.82) (-1.56) 
year  2005  -0.0151 -0.0189 -0.0140 -0.00875 
  (-0.57) (-0.72) (-0.54) (-0.33) 
year  2006  -0.122*** -0.120*** -0.180*** -0.170*** 
  (-4.18) (-4.08) (-5.45) (-5.12) 
Net  margin  -0.182*** -0.178*** -0.112**  -0.0617 
  (-3.35) (-3.26) (-2.05) (-0.90) 
Net  margin  squared  0.222** 0.218** 0.167*  0.199* 
  (2.17) (2.13) (1.75) (1.84) 
Tenured employment    0.144*  0.163**  0.163** 
    (1.86) (2.33) (2.34) 
Strenuous  work    0.0690  0.0597 
    (0.55)  (0.49)   23 
Lower Administrative Staff      0.110**  0.0922* 
    (2.20)  (1.90) 
Higher Administrative Staff      0.183***  0.186*** 
    (5.95)  (6.13) 
Lecturer    0.178***  0.195*** 
    (5.09)  (5.59) 
Administration     0.0723 
     ( 1 . 4 1 )  
Humanities     -0.0651** 
     ( - 2 . 0 9 )  
Law  School     0.00745 
     ( 0 . 1 6 )  
Natural  Sciences     0.0458 
     ( 1 . 6 2 )  
Library     -0.0524 
     ( - 1 . 1 8 )  
Constant  1.064*** 0.951*** 0.780*** 0.774*** 
  (9.60) (7.44) (6.20) (6.19) 
Observations  1127 1127 1127 1127 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.64 0.64 0.66 0.67 
F  176.3 163.2 125.6 104.5 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
PEAK VALUE REGRESSION 
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Appendix 1: The variables 
 




•  woman: indicator of gender. 
•  age: age of the individual 
•  anstform: Indicator of form of employment. There are two categories in the data set: 
an open-ended contract or a temporary employment. 
•  befattning: title of position held at Stockholm University. In the data set there were 57 
different categories. The variable that codes those different categories is befkod. 
•  arb: variable created from aggregating “befattning” to six categories: strenuous work, 
lower administrative personnel, higher administrative personnel, researcher, lecturer 
and professor. 
•  slutsorsak: reason for exiting employment at a specific position at Stockholm 
University. There are thirteen possibilities. Those categories are lack of work, change 
of position within one's department, county council, private sector employment, state 
sector employment, termination of temporary employment, change of employment to 
other university, old-age pension, early old-age pension, supplementary pension, 
disability pension, and other or unknown reasons. The variable that codes the different 
categories is slutorsak. 
•  anst2: An indicator of when a person is employed at Stockholm University. It is 
logically fulfilled if the individual's slutorsak is either change of position within one's 
department or none of the other definitions of slutorsak. 
•  syss_grad: working hours as part of full-time employment. 
•  anstdatsu: date of starting employment at Stockholm University. 
•  anstdatstat: date of starting employment in the state sector. 
•  ansttid~0604: tenure as of end of March 2006. 
•  lengthsu: created from ansttid~0604 to specify duration of position held. 
•  institution: indicator of department affiliation
13. The variable is more specific than the 
name suggests, as it also specifies different sub-sections of departments and other 
administrative units. The variable that codes department affiliation, on department 
level only is orghem. 
•  fakultet: Indicator of in which faculty the individual is employed. There are four 
faculties at Stockholm University: Law, Humanities, Social Sciences and Natural 
Sciences. The variable also includes two units that are not faculties: the Stockholm 
University Library and the Administration. 
•  utbet: annual payment (net of taxes) utbet_tsn is defined as utbet/10000 and adjusted 
for CPI with 2003 being the base year.  
•  avtal: pension agreement. There are two agreements in the data set: A01 and C01. 
•  omf: phased retirement as a part of full-time employment. 
•  delp: indicator variable of participation in the phased retirement program.  
                                                 
13 In general, the label 'department' will be used to apply to all forms of university institutions at the same 
administrative level.   27
•  eligible_ind: a created variable indicating whether the individual at a given year is 
eligible to apply to the phased retirement program. The indicator is logically fulfilled 
if the individual is older than 60, but younger than 65, working hours as part of full-
time are > 50 per cent, the person in question if employed as defined by ans2, not 
retired as defined by retired and has not chosen the phased retirement option as 
defined by delp.  
 
Financial characteristics of the departments or other Stockholm 
University institutions 
•  oms: total revenue. oms_ttsn is defined as oms/10000 and adjusted for CPI with the 
year 2003 as base. 
•  kap: annual capital gain. kap_ttsn is defined as kap/10000 and adjusted for CPI with 
the year 2003 as base. 
•  ib: balance brought forward. ib_ttsn is defined as ib/10000 and adjusted for CPI with 
the year 2003 as base. 
•  ub: balance carried forward. ub_ttsn is defined as ub/10000 and adjusted for CPI with 
the year 2003 as base. 
•  eko: a created rate of return variable. See (<ref>eko2.2</ref>). 
•  eko2: a created rate of return variable See (<ref>eko2</ref>). 
•  index: CPI; year 2003 is the base year. 
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Appendix 2: Computation of pension benefits:  
All the values are expressed in the year 2003 values. The following values for the basic 
amounts are used: Basic Amount (BA) = 38 600, Income Basic Amounts (IBA) = 40 900, 
Increased Basic amounts (IncBA) = 39 400.  
The public pension system 
Upon retirement the individuals in our dataset will be subject to the rules governing the pre-
reformed Swedish public pension system and the new one. Depending on the individual’s 
year of birth, different weight will be attached to how large of a share comes from the new 
pension system and how large fro the old.  
The pre-reform pension system consisted of a flat benefit part and a defined benefit PAYGO 
part (called the ATP), where one’s old age pension was computed on the basis of one’s 15 
best years out of 30, up to a ceiling governed by 7.5 Income Basic Amounts (IBA). The 
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where the pension rights income falls in the range between one IBA and 7.5 IBA. For our 
calculations we have taken the pension rights income to be the annual salary paid and 
assumed that Ni = 30 for all.  
The flat rate benefit is computed as t it BA FP × = 96 . 0 , where BA is the Basic Amount (BA).  
The reformed pension system consists of the three parts: an income-based pension, a fully 
funded part and a guarantee pension. We have only used the first one in our computations. 
The income pension (IP) was computed according to the following:  
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The divisor is a gender neutral actuarial constant set annually by the Swedish Social Insurance 
Agency and varies for different cohorts and retirement years. For the years after retirement, 
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Finally, the total benefit was computed as  
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where α is a weight stemming from the cohort an individual belongs to, see the Table below 
for the different weights:  
 









There are two occupational pension plans used in our calculations for the government workers, 
PA 1991 and PA 2003. Both plans are comprised of several components, where the largest 
one is a PAYGO defined benefit plan based on a percentage of the average of the last five 
years of the worker’s salary. The difference between the plans that used in this study is in that 
the PA 1991 uses the IBA as its base amount and that the replacement rates are constant for 
all in the span 1938-1942.  
                                                 
14 In actuality only 16 per cent of the pension rights income is put in the notional account of the individual. The 
remaining 2.5 per cent is the premium pension. As we do not have the data on this, we implicitly assume that the 












* 0.325·(salary-20IBA)  + 
0.65·(salary-7.5IBA)
*  
1943 0.095·salary 0.6485·(salary-7.5IncBA)  0.324·(salary-20IncBA)  +   
0.6485·(salary-7.5IncBA) 
1944 0.093·salary 0.647·(salary-7.5IncBA) 0.323·(salary-20IncBA)  +   
0.647·(salary-7.5IncBA 
1945 0.091·salary 0.6455·(salary-7.5IncBA)  0.322·(salary-20IncBA)  +   
0.6455·(salary-7.5IncBA) 
* Increased Base Amount is used 
 
The table below shows the different percentages, based on the level of the last five years of 
earnings. Hence if the average of the last five years earnings of a person born before 1943 
falls between one IncBA and 7.5 IncBA's then the pension benefit will be 10 per cent of that 
salary. Similarly if such a person earns in the middle category, (s)he will get 65 per cent of 
what is above the 7.5 of the basic amounts.  
 
Pension wealth 
The pension wealth variable is calculated by summing up the benefits from the public pension 
system and the occupational pensions. Hence at each of the ages of the eligible persons we 
calculate what the individual can expect to receive starting from the age of 65 from the old-
age pension and the occupational pension. From there we get the accrual measure and the 
peak value measure.  
For the people who have already chosen phased retirement we assume that they will continue 
with it until their retirement at 65 years of age. These individuals have the accrual and peak 
value equal to zero as they cannot postpone their decision.    31
Appendix 3: Imputations from the Labor Force Surveys 
Below follow the coefficients from the Labor Force Survey 2003 regression. The dependent 
variable is the sum of the monthly earnings of the individuals employed in the public sector. 
The earnings were then multiplied by 12 to make them annual.  
The 'working category' variables are created from the socioeconomic indicator variable, 
HUSEI. The category physically demanding work was taken from the category ' unskilled 
worker' (SEI code 1-22), the category 'blue collar worker' was taken from the SEI codes 33-46, 
'white collar worker' was taken from SEI 50 and 'white collar worker, higher level' was taken 
from the category 56 and 57.  
 
 (1)  (2) 
COEFFICIENT Earnings  ln(Earnings) 
    
Age 1619***  0.00469*** 




 (-23.8)  (-27.6) 
Blue collar worker  34254*** 0.130*** 
 (9.82)  (13.4) 
White collar worker  94241*** 0.313*** 
 (25.8)  (30.8) 









 (40.0)  (935) 
Observations 8224  8224 
Adjusted R-squared  0.28  0.32 
F 634.6  762.1 
t statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Linear and Log Specifications 